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A relational approach to quantum reference frames for spins
Jacques Pienaar
In the literature on quantum reference frames, the internal (relative) properties of a system are
defined as those which are preserved under an arbitrary change of reference frame. For a system
of quantum spins, these are all properties preserved by proper spatial rotations of the laboratory.
However, this approach does not account for the hypothetical possibility of the laboratory becoming
entangled to the system, as described by a second laboratory (the ‘Wigner’s friend’ scenario), in
which case the relationship between the two laboratories is not a rotation, but is fundamentally
quantum. To overcome this limitation, we re-define the reference frame transformations to be those
that preserve the fidelities between subsystems. This enables us to derive U(2) as the correct
symmetry group for transformations of a system of N spin-half particles. Next, we propose that
systems having the same internal properties should be regarded as physically equivalent in the
absence of an external frame. Remarkably, this implies that a single spin in a superposition relative
to a spin magnet is equivalent to a macroscopic superposition of the magnet relative to the spin.
We discuss the implications of this result for the Wigner’s friend paradox.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the meaning of a quantum state |Ψ〉? It can
ultimately only have meaning in the context of a lab-
oratory in which it is possible to prepare and measure
quantum systems under controlled conditions. The state
represents a comparison between the state of the ob-
served system and the states of the measuring devices.
If we assume the physical state of the laboratory is fixed,
then any change in the state of the system must be inter-
preted as a physical change in the system (and not the
laboratory). More generally, the laboratory can itself be
treated as a physical system subject to change, and hence
changes in the state of the system only represent changes
in the relationship between system and laboratory. This
is called a relational interpretation of the state.
Relational interpretations are not new; they include
Everett’s ‘relative state interpretation’ [1], Rovelli’s rela-
tional interpretation [2], and Quantum Bayesianism [3].
These approaches all agree that the quantum state de-
scribes relative information, but disagree on whose in-
formation it is, and what the information is about. In
all cases, however, the measurable properties of a sys-
tem can be split into two categories: those that change
when the system is measured in a different laboratory,
and those that are measured to be the same in all lab-
oratories. We call these properties external or internal,
respectively [22].
At one extreme, a subjective Bayesian (see eg. Ref.
[4]) might say that the quantum state represents only the
beliefs of a rational agent. In this case all properties are
external, since every state is a valid description of the
beliefs of some agent, and the laws of physics describe
how these beliefs should be updated in light of measure-
ment outcomes. At the other extreme, a psi-ontologist
(see eg. Ref. [5]) would claim that two different states
represent two different objective realities, hence all prop-
erties of the system are internal and do not depend on
the observer.
In this work, we wish to explore a middle ground, in-
spired by Rovelli’s relational interpretation, according to
which different observers may give different accounts of
the same physical situation. It follows that any disagree-
ments between them must be about external quantities.
However, since the observers themselves must obey quan-
tum mechanics, their accounts must also be consistent
with each other to some degree. The internal proper-
ties are precisely those facts that all observers can agree
upon. Our aim is to pin down what these properties
are, and to decide exactly what it means for two states
to represent the ‘same physical situation’ in a relational
quantum world.
It is clear that the distinction between external and
internal properties cannot be fundamental, so long as we
give no fundamental significance to the attendant dis-
tinction between the laboratory and the system. Never-
theless, the distinction is relevant to practical considera-
tions. For example, consider two laboratories attempting
to exchange quantum information, but whose measuring
devices are not mutually aligned. Since the receiver is ig-
norant of the sender’s reference frame, he must sum over
all possibilities, in effect applying a random transforma-
tion to the external degrees of freedom. This destroys
any information encoded in these degrees of freedom, re-
ducing the parties’ ability to communicate. This is the
basis for the literature on quantum reference frames [6–
8], which provides an extensive toolbox of methods for
performing quantum communication, cryptography, tele-
portation and other information-theoretic tasks in situa-
tions where the laboratories do not share a given refer-
ence frame.
The work on quantum reference frames proceeds from
the assumption that the separation between internal and
external degrees of freedom is known. Usually, it is given
in the form of a symmetry group G that is postulated to
preserve only the internal degrees of freedom. The sym-
metry group is justified by appealing to some natural
symmetry of the physical setting in question. For ex-
ample, if the systems to be communicated are spin-half
particles, it seems logical that the measuring instruments
in the laboratories are Stern-Gerlach magnets or similar.
2These instruments indicate a preferred Cartesian refer-
ence frame for the laboratory, representing the labelling
of the (x, y, z) co-ordinates in the lab. Since the Carte-
sian reference frames of the laboratories are related by a
proper rotation, the associated symmetry group is SO(3).
For quantum particles, we typically seek a unitary repre-
sentation of the rotation group, hence G = SU(2).
Most of the literature to date has restricted attention
to transformations that preserve the separation between
system and laboratory. That is to say, if one laboratory
performs a measurement on the system, the state is up-
dated according to the outcome of this measurement for
all laboratories, not just the laboratory in question. This
assumption excludes the possibility of treating the labo-
ratories themselves as quantum systems relative to one
another. For example, consider the following thought ex-
periment due to Wigner [9]: an experimenter called Fran
(a friend of Wigner) performs a measurement of the sys-
tem and obtains an outcome. It should then be pos-
sible for another experimenter in a different laboratory
(Wigner) to treat Fran and her laboratory as a quantum
system, and the measurement as a physical interaction
that entangles the state of Fran to the state of the sys-
tem. This physical interaction is a transformation that
applies not just to the system alone, but also to the whole
laboratory of Fran, thereby including this laboratory and
Fran herself as part of the ‘system’. Thus, Fran’s labora-
tory is in a superposition relative to Wigner’s laboratory.
So far, there have been few attempts to apply the tools
of quantum reference frames to physical settings of this
more general type.
We note the following exceptions. Palmer et. al. [10]
have considered the task of changing reference frames
in a setting where the reference frame is an explicitly
quantum object; however they do not extend their anal-
ysis to ‘Wigner’s friend’-type scenarios. Angelo et. al.
[11, 12], and Pereira and Angelo [13], following work by
Aharonov et. al. [14], consider the problem of treating
quantum systems as observers and changing frames be-
tween them. However, that work is concerned with linear
position and momentum degrees of freedom, whereas we
consider angular momentum and spin (since the rotation
group is compact, we can apply the standard tools of
quantum reference frames). Finally, Ho¨hn et. al. [15–17]
have managed to reconstruct quantum mechanics and its
key symmetry groups for qubits using an operational ap-
proach that inspired the approach used in the present
work; however they also do not address the Wigner’s
friend scenario.
In this work, we make an incremental step towards
extending the formalism of quantum reference frames
to more general scenarios of the kind applicable to the
Wigner’s friend thought experiment. Our main idea is
to try and derive the symmetry group of reference frame
transformations from first principles, rather than pos-
tulating it from a classical limit, in the hopes that the
resulting physical symmetry will permit us to draw an
equivalence between the apparently irreconcilable states
seen by Wigner and his friend. Although we ultimately
do not succeed in this task, we are able to find an exam-
ple that transcends the usual system-apparatus division
in the absence of an external reference frame, indicating
that future efforts along similar lines might bear fruit.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we
consider a system composed of spins and ask what prop-
erties should be the same for all observers. We argue that
all observers should be subject to the same constraints
on their ability to distinguish between subsystems of the
total system. Taking the quantum fidelity between sub-
systems as a measure of their distinguishability, we ob-
tain U(2) as the symmetry group that preserves them. In
Section III we examine the bearing this result has on the
microscopic / macroscopic distinction and the Wigner’s
friend thought experiment. Section IV contains our con-
clusions and outlook.
II. THE INTERNAL PROPERTIES OF SPINS
Our task is to define the internal properties of general
pure states |Ψ〉 of N spins, namely, the attributes of the
system that do not depend on the observer’s laboratory.
In what follows, we assume that all laboratories can agree
on a labeling of the N spins, so that if one observer spec-
ifies a subsystem of spins, say “spins numbered 7 − 12”,
all the observers agree on which subsystem this refers to.
Measurements of spin performed within a laboratory are
relative to the (arbitrary) orientation of that laboratory’s
spatial axes. The procedure for measuring ‘spin up’ in a
given direction is assumed to be the same for all spins,
hence labeling the ‘up’ direction for one spin fixes the
label for all spins in the same lab. Finally, we assume all
observers can measure the number of spins in any sub-
system without difficulty. Other than that, the devices
in the laboratories are not calibrated with each other.
The problem can now be understood as follows. If
a system of N spins is prepared according to a fixed
preparation procedure, it will nevertheless have a differ-
ent state according to different laboratories. We want to
know: how much can the states seen by two laboratories
differ? Clearly, any differences can only be attributed to
a change of laboratory frame, since the preparation of
the system is invariant. We have assumed that the labo-
ratories are related by collective transformations of their
apparatuses that preserve the number of spins and the
spin ordering, but otherwise the symmetry group that
relates the laboratories is unknown.
Our first clue comes from asking how well the labora-
tories are able to distinguish different preparation proce-
dures. Imagine that a machine prepares N -spin systems
according one of two preparation procedures, A or B.
In the first phase of the experiment, it prepares many
systems using procedure A and sends multiple copies to
each laboratory for analysis. In the second phase, it does
the same but only using procedure B. As a result, each
laboratory is able to perform tomography on the systems
3they received and determine the state obtained from each
preparation procedure relative to their own instruments.
In general, the pair of states ρA, ρB seen by one lab will
not be the same as the pair ρ′A, ρ
′
B in another lab.
In the third phase of the experiment, the machine
sends only a single copy of the system to each laboratory,
and in each case it chooses randomly which preparation
procedure to use: with probability p it applies procedure
A, and with probability (1− p) it applies B. Each lab is
then asked to guess whether the system they received was
prepared using procedure A or B. They can use only the
knowledge they have gained in the previous two phases,
plus the value of p.
Since the pair of states being distinguished will in gen-
eral differ among laboratories, it is a priori possible that
one laboratory might consistently perform better at the
task than another laboratory (for instance, if the pair
of states seen by one laboratory are more alike than the
states as seen by another laboratory). Hopefully, this
possibility strikes the reader as rather unnatural. After
all, the laboratories are all trying to distinguish systems
produced by the same pair of preparation procedures,
and these procedures are frame-independent notions, so
we intuitively expect that no laboratory has any special
advantage over another. Hence, the likelihood of suc-
ceeding should be independent of which laboratory (i.e.
observer) is asked to perform the task.
Without loss of generality, we can imagine that
the machine implements the two preparations by first
preparing a single system according to a fixed procedure
and then choosing one of two N -spin subsystems,
designated A or B, as the output. For example, let
N = 3. Starting with an initially prepared state of
M ≥ N spins, the machine could choose either spins
5, 11, 14 (subsystem A) or spins 17, 42, 99 (subsystem
B), discard the rest, and re-label the chosen spins 1, 2, 3.
In this way, the choice of preparation procedure reduces
to a choice of subsystems sampled from a larger system
with a fixed preparation. With this perspective, the
considerations of the previous paragraph amount to the
statement that all laboratories should be equally good
at distinguishing a given pair of subsystems of a total
system prepared by a fixed procedure. This forms our
first postulate:
Postulate 1: Let A and B label two (not necessarily
disjoint) equal-sized subsystems of a quantum system
prepared by a fixed procedure. We assume that all
observers have access to identically prepared copies of
this total system and its subsystems. Then the ability of
any observer to distinguish A from B (when presented
with a random sample of either one) must be the same
for all observers.
(Note that although we motivated this postulate from
the example of spins, its scope is quite general). For a
given pair of states ρA and ρB, quantum mechanics sup-
plies bounds on their distinguishability. If just a single
copy of the state is provided, then the appropriate mea-
sure of distinguishability is the quantum error probability.
More generally, after randomly choosing whether to pre-
pare A or B, the machine could send a fixed number of
copies of the system to each lab. In this case, there is
a whole zoo of distinguishability measures that could be
used (see eg. Ref [18]). We will adopt the quantum fi-
delity as the measure of interest in the remainder of this
work, but we conjecture that the results obtained here
hold also for other measures of distinguishability. The
quantum fidelity can be expressed as:
F (ρA, ρB) := min
{Fk}
∑
k
√
Tr [ρAFk] Tr [ρBFk] , (1)
where the minimisation is over all possible POVMs {Fk}
on the Hilbert space of the systems.
Why choose the fidelity? For spins, the fidelity can
be related to the relative spatial angles between the spin
vectors. Specifically, if we restrict attention to a tensor
product of N pure spin states, then the state space is iso-
morphic to a set of unit vectors in 3-dimensional space
(Bloch vectors). In that case, a natural candidate for the
internal properties of the system are the relative angles
between the Bloch vectors. The angle θij between the ith
and jth vectors is directly related to the overlap |〈φj |φi〉|
between their respective states, which is just the fidelity
in this case. For more general (entangled) states, the fi-
delities can be related to angles between Bloch vectors of
the purifications of the spin states (Uhlmann’s theorem,
Ref. [19]). The connection between the fidelities and the
relative angles between spatial vectors is one of the main
inspirations for using the fidelity as the measure of distin-
guishability. However, it is merely a heuristic motivation,
as the Bloch vectors of higher-dimensional systems obvi-
ously do not exist in 3-dimensional space. Ultimately, we
have chosen the fidelities mostly because they are math-
ematically convenient and lead to interesting results.
An N spin system can be partitioned into subsys-
tems of different numbers of spins. Obviously, if the
subsystems have different sizes, they are perfectly
distinguishable by measuring the number of spins, so
the only nontrivial cases arise when the subsystems
have equal numbers of spins. This is important, because
the fidelity is defined only for subsystems of equal size.
Using the fidelity, we can now give a mathematical
version of Postulate 1 for spins:
Postulate 1 for spins: Given an arbitrary pure
state |Ψ〉 consisting of N spins, the internal properties
are the set of fidelities F (ρA, ρB) between all subsystems
ρA, ρB with equal numbers of spins.
We next show that these fidelities are preserved by
(and only by) actions of the unitary group U(2):
Theorem 1: The set of fidelity-preserving transfor-
mations acting on the N -spin Hilbert space is the image
4of a unitary representation of the group U(2), namely:
pi : V ∈ U(2) 7→ V ⊗N ∈ U(2N ) . (2)
Proof: The action of a unitary U on |Ψ〉 induces the
following transformations on the reduced states:
ρA → Tr 6=A
[
U |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U †] := E(ρA) ,
ρB → Tr6=B
[
U |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U †] := E ′(ρB) . (3)
It can be shown using Uhlmann’s theorem [19] that the
fidelity will be preserved only if the CPT maps are the
same, i.e. E ′ = E . We then make use of a theorem
due to Molnar [20], which states that the fidelities are
preserved if and only if E(ρ) = V ρV † for some unitary V
acting on the Hilbert space of the subsystems (this is a
generalisation of a well-known theorem of Wigner [21]).
It follows that U decomposes into U = UAUBUR where
R labels the systems not in A or B, and UA = UB = V .
Applying this to all pairs of single-spin subsystems
leads to the conclusion that U preserves the fidelities iff
U = V ⊗N with V ∈ U(2). Under the map V 7→ V ⊗N ,
the image of U(2) in U(2N ) is therefore precisely the
set of fidelity preserving maps acting on the space of N
spins. 
While U(2) is the appropriate group for states in
Hilbert space, one is typically concerned only with
‘physical states’ in the form of projectors |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, which
live in the projective Hilbert space. In that case, the
following corollary applies:
Corollary: Under the representation mentioned in
Theorem 1, fidelity-preserving maps that act on the
projective Hilbert space constitute the image of the
group SO(3).
Proof: Theorem 1 implies that the fidelity-preserving
unitaries acting on the projective space have the form
W⊗N , where W is any element of the 1-spin projective
unitary group PU(2). This defines the representation
of PU(2) by fidelity-preserving unitaries acting on the
projective space, and since PU(2) is isomorphic to
SO(3), the statement of the Corollary follows. 
The symmetry group of reference frame transforma-
tions is usually taken for granted in the literature, but we
have derived it using a novel assumption (Postulate 1).
Note that since the fidelities are not in general indepen-
dent, they should be reducible to a smaller set of indepen-
dent internal properties, which we have not attempted to
identify here. It is straightforward to do so using tools
from the literature on quantum reference frames; for ex-
ample, Eq. 3.20 in [7] presents the decomposition into
collective and relative (i.e. internal) degrees of freedom
for the group SU(2), and one sees that the internal de-
grees of freedom span the degenerate subspaces of states
with definite total angular momentum.
Although Theorem 1 states that fidelities are guaran-
teed to be preserved by all and only those unitaries with
the form U = V ⊗N , this does not imply that two states
having the same fidelities must necessarily be related by
a unitary map of this form. An example of this intriguing
situation will be explored in the next section.
III. PHYSICAL INTERPRETATION
In analogy with special relativity, let us assume that
transformations that preserve the internal properties
relate physically equivalent situations. That is, the
internal properties constitute the observer-independent
core of quantum mechanics:
Postulate 2: In the absence of a preferred external
reference frame, two quantum states of the same number
of spins represent the same physical situation iff they
have the same internal properties (i.e. the same fidelities
between their subsystems).
This leads to the following counter-intuitive result: a
microscopic superposition as seen by one lab can appear
to be a macroscopic superposition as seen by a different
lab. Let B := {|η1, η2, ...ηM 〉} with η ∈ {0, 1} be the
computational basis for a set of M spins. Consider the
following two states, expressed in the basis B:
|φ〉 = |00...0〉 (α|0〉+ β|1〉)
:= |0〉1|Φ〉 ,
|φ′〉 = (α|00...0〉+ β|11...1〉) |0〉
:= |Φ′〉|0〉M . (4)
The first state |φ〉 might represent, for example, a large
magnet consisting of M − 1 spins, with the Mth spin in
a superposition relative to the magnet. The basis B is
a natural or preferred choice of labeling in a laboratory
where the physical states corresponding to elements of B
are easy to prepare, and where superpositions of these
elements are easy to prepare whenever the correspond-
ing elements of B are similar to each other. An example
is the state |φ〉, whose superposed states differ at only
a single spin in the basis B; we call |φ〉 a microscopic
superposition relative to such a lab. Conversely, if the
two superposed states are very different when expressed
in the natural basis of the lab, the state represents a
macroscopic superposition. Thus |φ′〉 is macroscopic rel-
ative to the lab for which B is the natural basis. If we
have a preferred basis B in which to prepare both these
states, we will find they appear physically different, the
state |φ′〉 being significantly harder to prepare than the
state |φ〉. We now observe that these two states have the
5same internal quantities, namely:
F (ρA, ρB) = 1, if A,B exclude spin M ;
F (ρA, ρB) = |α|2 if M appears in one of A,B;
F (ρA, ρB) = |α|4 if M appears at different
sites in both A,B;
F (ρA, ρB) = 1 if M appears at the same
site in both A,B . (5)
Postulate 2 then asserts that, in the absence of a pre-
ferred external reference frame, these states should be
physically equivalent. To see how this can occur, con-
sider a different basis B′ related to B by a transforma-
tion that exchanges 0 ↔ 1 in all elements except for
|00...0〉 and |11...1〉. For instance, for M = 3 the super-
position (|000〉+ |001〉)/√2 in the basis B corresponds to
(|000〉 + |110〉)/√2 in the basis B′. Notice that |φ〉 and
|φ′〉 switch roles when expressed in terms of basis B′. This
means that if they are both prepared in a lab for which
B′ is the preferred basis, |φ′〉 will be microscopic (hence
easier to prepare) and |φ〉 will appear macroscopic. This
example clearly shows that if no preferred basis is speci-
fied (i.e. there is no external lab to tell us which basis is
most natural) the states |φ′〉 and |φ〉 may be regarded as
representing the same physical situation.
Comment: there is a certain intuition according to
which one might expect an electron in superposition with
respect to a large magnet to ‘see’ the magnet as being in a
superposition. This procedure of ‘stepping into the elec-
tron’s shoes’ and talking about ‘what the electron sees’
seems to fit with the transformation from |φ〉 to |φ′〉. One
must be careful in making such claims, however, since as
we have shown above, this physical equivalence of frames
can only be maintained in the absence of a preferred ex-
ternal basis. In practice, there always exists a preferred
basis for the external laboratory, which is singled out by
decoherence of the system and measuring apparatus by a
common environment. This is why, for example, placing
a single particle in a spatial superposition over a long dis-
tance is considered ‘macroscopic’: the environment tends
to decohere systems in the position basis. An interesting
task for future work would be to include the environment
in the preceding analysis, to see explicitly how it breaks
the symmetry between the states |φ′〉 and |φ〉.
Setting aside decoherence, one might still expect this
surprising equivalence of states to have some bearing on
the problem of Wigner’s friend. After all, it presents a
dual perspective that seems to correspond to the conflict-
ing experiences of the two parties: in one point of view
(Wigner), theMth spin is in a superposition, while in the
other point of view (Fran) it’s spin has a definite value.
The fact that the two points of view are reconciled by
Postulate 2 seems promising. Alas, further investigation
leads us to conclude that the analogy cannot be made
precise. In order to do so, it would be necessary to treat
Fran as a physical system (perhaps herself composed of
spin-half particles) initially entangled to spin M . The
task would then be to discover a state having the same
fidelities as the original, but in which the spin M has a
definite value, in accordance with what we expect Fran
to see. The problem is that the equivalence of |φ′〉 and
|φ〉 seems to be rather a special case: simple generaliza-
tions, like adding more spins to the initially superposed
state, or even adding an extra magnet pointing in a dif-
ferent direction, lead to states whose fidelity-equivalent
counterparts don’t seem to possess the desired proper-
ties. For the present, it is left as an open problem to
classify the sets of physically equivalent states induced
by the fidelities via Postulate 2, but our efforts so far
seem to indicate that these equivalence classes are not
rich enough to capture the duality between Wigner and
Fran’s conflicting experiences.
Despite this disappointment, the example does show
that if we take internal properties as fundamental, and
their symmetry transformations as merely derived, then
the line between apparatus and measured system can be
transgressed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that it is possible to derive U(2) as the
group that preserves the internal degrees of freedom of
spins by postulating (cf. Postulate 1) that the internal
degrees of freedom are the fidelities between subsystems
of spins. Furthermore, we proposed that states having
the same internal quantities should represent the same
‘physical situation’, differing only in terms of the descrip-
tion relative to some laboratory (Postulate 2). This led
to the observation that, in absence of a preferred external
laboratory, microscopic and macroscopic superpositions
become equivalent.
The work presented here was inspired by the idea that,
in certain circumstances, a single quantum particle can
be considered an observer. Indeed, the approach shows
promise for reconciling the viewpoints of Wigner and his
friend in the thought experiment, by utilizing the notion
of an equivalence class of states all having the same inter-
nal properties. Unfortunately, we were unable to achieve
this goal using the fidelities as the relevant degrees of
freedom.
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